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Taking Stock of the TTIP Talks
 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) is a trade agreement that is being negotiated be-
tween the European Union (EU) and the United States 
(US).  The goal of the TTIP is to remove trade barriers 
in a variety of economic sectors, including technical 
regulations, standards and commercial approval proce-
dures. The TTIP negotiations also aim to open markets 
for services, investment, and public procurement. Both 
the EU and the US have optimistically touted that the 
successful conclusion of the TTIP will promote signifi-
cant economic growth and create thousands of jobs 
on both sides of the Atlantic. The formal negotiations 
on the TTIP began in July 2013, but the second round 
of talks were initially cancelled in October due to the 
temporary shut-down of the US federal government.
 Although the TTIP negotiations have only just 
begun, three members of the EUSA interest section 
on Political Economy have taken up the challenge of 
examining a few important dimensions of the ongoing 
talks. David Cleeton, a co-chair of the section, presents 
an overview of the existing transatlantic trade and in-
vestment relations and examines the potential effect of 
the TTIP. In her contribution to this forum, Lucia Quaglia 
looks specifically at why new regulations on financial 
services were left out of the TTIP negotiations and how 
this will cause extraterritorial issues in this policy domain 
to endure. Finally, the other co-chair of the Political 
Economy section, Miguel Otero Iglesias, considers the 
TTIP from the perspective of China, particularly its view 
that the TTIP is an attempt by the United States to thwart 
improved relations between Brussels and Beijing.
.
John D. Occhipinti 
EUSA Review Editor
Gauging the Potential of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership
David L. Cleeton
 In 2012, EU-US trade and investment flows con-
tinued to rebound and significantly outstrip domestic 
growth.  With over $1 trillion of trade in goods and ser-
vices, the transatlantic trade partnership remains the 
strongest bilateral link in the global economy.  The ratio 
between trade in goods and services stands at about 
2-to-1.  Table 1 shows the rebound since 2010 from 
the depths of the financial crisis induced downturn in 
the global economy with trade flows in 2012 standing 
around ten percent higher than in 2008.  Table 2 shows 
the comparative position, in 2012, of the EU and US in 
the larger trade relations conducted by each.  More than 
17 percent of all EU exports are destined for the United 
while EU imports from the US are 11.5 percent of total 
EU imports.  This combination makes the United States 
the most important trade partner for the European Union, 
associated with 14.3 percent of all the EU’s trade flows. 
The EU is the second leading source of US imports, 
standing at 15.8 percent of all imports and the second 
largest buyer of US exports with 16.5 percent.  These 
figures make the European Union the prime trade partner 
of the United States, comprising 16.1 percent of its total 
trade. 
 As foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from the 
EU to the US have slowed significantly in the post-crisis 
period, the cumulative stock of FDI remains high with 
61.8 percent of the total EU FDI stock, or a level of $1.57 
trillion, invested in the US at the end of 2011.  The level of 
US FDI located in the EU at the end of 2011 stood at 50.4 
percent of the total, or at a level of $2.10 trillion.  These 
high degrees of investment in each other’s economies 
demonstrate the symbiotic long-run relationship which 
exists within the transatlantic business community (See 
Table 3).  The level of investment reflects the depth of 
the global nexus of production, distribution, and supply-
chain management centered in the EU-US trade and 
investment infrastructure. 
 While the EU continues to struggle to build a growth-
oriented macroeconomic policy mix and the US con-
fronts a sustained period of slow growth in the face of 
significant deficit spending and expansionary monetary 
policy, the steady expansion of trade and investment 
flows offers a potential for interactive growth without 
direct governmental fiscal or monetary policy expansion. 
A significant new trade and investment agreement has 
the potential to add significant expansionary growth in 
an era of extremely low growth.  The negotiations for 
TTIP have been launched.
 These talks follow on efforts completed last year 
by trade envoys under the EU-US High Level Working 
Group (HLWG) on Jobs and Growth.  The strategy is to 
significantly expand the domain of bargaining over trade 
in goods and services into related realms of investment 
protocols and regulatory regimes.  As the scope of ne-
gotiations grows significantly there should be improved 
opportunities to balance and trade off concessions 
across various elements of the broad agenda.
 The seven comprehensive areas outlined by the 
HLWG focus on the following:
• Reducing or eliminating tariffs with provisions 
for sensitive sectors
• Regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers (e.g.,  
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Table 1.  EU-US Goods Trade Flows  
EuropeanUnion Trade with UnitedStates                                                                                                      
millionsofeuro,% 
 
Period 
 
Imports        
Variation 
(%,y-o-y) 
 
Shareoftotal 
EUImports(%) 
 
Exports        
Variation 
(%,y-o-y) 
 
Shareoftotal 
EUExports(%) 
 
Balance 
 
Trade 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
182,351              3.0 
154,858          -15.1 
173,067            11.8 
191,515            10.7 
205,778              7.4 
11.5 
12.5 
11.3 
11.1 
11.5 
247,818            -4.5 
203,589          -17.8 
242,451            19.1 
263,791              8.8 
291,880            10.6 
18.8 
18.5 
17.8 
16.9 
17.3 
65,467 
48,731 
69,385 
72,276 
86,102 
430,168 
358,446 
415,518 
455,306 
497,658 
        
Source:  EUROSTAT 
 
Table 2.  
EU Trade with Main Partners (2012) 
 MAIN PARTNERS (2012) 
The Major Imports Partners The Major Exports Partners The Major Trade Partners 
 
Rk Partner Mio euro % Rk Partner Mio euro % Rk Partner Mio euro % 
Extra EU27 1,791,727 100.0% Extra EU27 1,686,774 100.0% Extra EU27 3,478,501 100.0% 
1 China 289,915 16.2% 1 US 291,880 17.3% 1 US 497,658 14.3% 
2 Russia 213,212 11.9% 2 China 143,874 8.5% 2 China 433,789 12.5% 
3 US 205,778 11.5% 3 CH 133,341 7.9% 3 Russia 336,474 9.7% 
4 CH 104,544 5.8% 4 Russia 123,262 7.3% 4 CH 237,885 6.8% 
5 Norway 100,437 5.6% 5 Turkey 75,172 4.5% 5 Norway 150,258 4.3% 
 
US Trade with Main Partners (2012) 
 
The Major Imports Partners The Major Export Partners The Major Trade Partners 
 
Rk Partner Mio euro % Rk Partners Mio euro % Rk Partner Mio euro % 
World (all 
countries) 
1,916,210 100.0% World (all 
countries) 
1,252,984 100.0% World (all 
countries) 
3,169,195 100.0% 
1 China 346,358 18.1% 1 Canada 227,067 18.1% 1 EU27 510,196 16.1% 
2 EU27 303,078 15.8% 2 EU27 207,118 16.5% 2 Canada 482,809 15.2% 
3 Canada 255,742 13.3% 3 Mexico 168,404 13.4% 3 China 432,357 13.6% 
4 Mexico 217,959 11.4% 4 China 85,999 6.9% 4 Mexico 386,362 12.2% 
5 Japan 117,055 6.1% 5 Japan 54,523 4.4% 5 Japan 171,577 5.4% 
 
Source:  EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4) 
Table 3.Extra EU Partners for FDI Positions, end-of-year in € million) 
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 sanitary and phytosanitaryissues) (See Cadot  
 and Malouche 2012) 
• Services
• Investment
• Government procurement
• Intellectual property rights
• Rule-making for the 21st century, e.g., trade fa       
 cilitation, competition policy
• Labor and environmental issues
 The first two items focus on the trade in goods and 
will explore innovated solutions to market access reforms 
including potential breakthroughs in the mutual setting 
or recognition of product standards.  These have been 
some of the most controversial area of trade policy in 
the recent past, particularly in the area of food safety, 
live-animal imports, GMOs, and biofuels. Tables 4 and 
5 show the importance of these and closely related 
concerns by listing the top-10 industrial categories for 
EU imports and exports of goods.  For example, in the 
sensitive area of agriculture, the TTIP negotiations will 
combine efforts toward reducing tariffs with reconciling 
non-tariff measures to broadly improve market access. 
In doing so, difficult issues regarding existing agricultural 
subsidies and border practices will arise.  
 In service trade and investment, market access 
restrictions remain widespread and regulatory policies 
in key sectors including insurance, telecommunications, 
and financial services remain problematic in producing a 
comprehensive solution to bolster trade and investment 
flows.  Likewise, intellectual property rights regimes and 
public procurement policies are complex and contra-
dictory and present major obstacles to growth of trade 
and investment in these critical global growth sectors. 
The Peterson Institute for International Economics has 
prepared an excellent policy brief which gives a compre-
hensive overview of all seven of the TTIP agenda areas 
and offers insights into possible negotiated settlements 
of the primary issues via reference to how the recently 
concluded US and EU free trade agreements with Japan 
and South Korea have approached similar issues and 
controversies (Schott and Cimino 2013).
 In evaluating the potential benefits from the suc-
cessful conclusion of the TTIP bargaining, the European 
Commission contracted with the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research to conduct a comprehensive modeling 
exercise (European Commission 2013). A summary of 
the findings are that an inclusive and wide-ranging TTIP 
agreement could benefit the EU to the magnitude of 
approximately €120 billion a year and €95 billion a year 
for the US.  These figures translate to €545 in disposal 
income for a family of 4 in the EU and a per-family figure 
of €655 in the US.  Beyond the partnership a similar 
magnitude, €100 billion per year, would accrue to the 
rest of the world as the liberalizing effects and cost sav-
ings potential from EU-US trade and investment feed 
through the global goods and services business network 
and supply-chain system.
 The study’s estimated effects on trade are impres-
sive.  EU exports to the US are predicted to increase by 
nearly 30 percent generating additional demand of the 
magnitude of €187 billion.  In comparison to the totals, 
exports from the EU would grow by 6 percent and from 
the US by 8 percent.  A decomposition of the sources of 
the gains produces an estimated 80 percent of growth 
to be associated with lowering non-tariff barriers which 
produce cost savings from fewer regulations and the 
liberalization of trade in services and governmental 
procurement.
 The study further demonstrates that both EU and 
US labor markets are not expected to be adversely im-
pacted.  Overall wage levels and additional positions for 
both high and low skilled workers would be realized with 
labor displacement falling within common labor market 
adaptations and regular bounds from adjustments to 
economic trends.
 EU and transatlantic scholars should continue to 
pay close attention to the evolving TTIP negotiations. 
The successful conclusion of these landmark negotia-
tions portends significant implications for the bonding 
and growth of the EU-US economic partnership and 
the direction of future multilateral trade and investment 
agreements.  With the cooling of emerging economies 
around the globe and a slowdown of the Asian economy, 
the strengthening of the transatlantic relationship offers 
important additional opportunities to maintain and grow 
the economic capacities and leadership role of the deeply 
linked EU-US economies. 
David L. Cleeton (Illinois State University)
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The TTIP and the Extraterritoriality of Post Crisis 
Financial Services regulation
Lucia Quaglia
 (This contribution draws on ‘The politics of extraterritorial-
ity in post-crisis financial services regulation in the European 
Union’; presented at the Conference on ‘Power, Finance 
and the Crisis’ in Berlin, 12-13 September 2013. I wish to 
acknowledge financial support from the British Academy and 
Leverhulme Trust (SG 120191.)
 Interviews conducted by the author in the summer of 
2013, reveal that the EU, unlike the US, has been keen 
to include financial regulation in the TTIP negotiations 
for a variety of reasons. First, the European Commis-
sion argued that post crisis regulatory reforms in the 
EU and the US have made it necessary to including 
financial services under TTIP talks with a view toward 
fine-tuning rules in these jurisdictions and preventing 
overlaps or ‘underlaps’. Second, the EU authorities 
preferred to negotiate with one set of US authorities 
(namely, trade authorities) in the context of the TTIP, 
rather than negotiating transatlantic financial regula-
tory issues with a multitude of US financial regulators. 
Third, the EU authorities hoped that US negotiators in 
TTIP would be more amenable to compromise than 
US financial regulators, whose primary mission was 
securing financial stability and consumer protection in 
the US. While the US authorities recognized the need 
for a US-EU regulatory dialogue on finance, primarily to 
deal with the extraterritorial effects of US and EU post-
crisis legislation, they were reluctant to include financial 
regulation under the TTIP. The main opposition came 
from US financial regulators, who opposed the discus-
sion of regulatory matters that were their responsibility 
as part of trade negotiations.
 In the end, financial regulation was not included in 
TTIP. Yet, the problem remains of how to deal with the 
extraterritorial effects of post-crisis financial regulation 
in the EU and US, which has the potential to trigger 
transatlantic regulatory disputes. Whereas extraterri-
toriality is nothing new in US financial regulation, it is a 
relatively recent regulatory trend in the EU. There are 
several meanings and definitions of extraterritoriality. Al-
though lawyers (and the European Commission) might 
find the following definition unsatisfactory, in a broad 
sense, it refers to national laws that ‘whether intended 
or not, have an impact upon persons or activities out-
side their borders. Extraterritoriality may be therefore 
defined as a situation in which regulations adopted in 
one jurisdiction affect directly or indirectly, and to a ma-
terial extent, activities or entities in other jurisdictions’ 
(Dallara 2013: 48). To this end, the main legal instru-
ment used by the EU is the concept of ‘equivalence’ 
(see Ferran 2012). By and large, equivalence means 
 
 
 
Table 5. European Union, Exports to US (2012) 
 
 TOTAL 291,880 100.0%  17.3% SITC7 Machineryand transportequipment 120,880 41.4%  17.1% SITC5 Chemicalsand related prod, n.e.s. 66,364 22.7%  24.0% SITC8 Miscellaneousmanufactured articles 33,524 11.5%  18.9% SITC6 Manufactured goodsclassified chieflybymaterial 29,336 10.1%  14.3% SITC3 Mineral fuels, lubricantsand related materials 19,442 6.7%  15.7% SITC1 Beveragesand tobacco 7,844 2.7%  27.1% SITC0 Food and liveanimals 5,626 1.9%  8.0% SITC2 Crudematerials, inedible, exceptfuels 2,608 0.9%  6.1% SITC9 Commoditiesand transactionsn.c.e. 1,940 0.7%  3.8% SITC4 Animal and vegetable oils, fatsand waxes 741 0.3%  15.9% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.European Union, Imports from US (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL 205,778 100.0%  11.5% SITC7 Machineryand transportequipment 78,711 38.3%  17.4% SITC5 Chemicalsand related prod, n.e.s. 43,681 21.2%  27.0% SITC8 Miscellaneousmanufactured articles 25,437 12.4%  11.6% SITC3 Mineral fuels, lubricantsand related materials 19,697 9.6%  3.6% SITC6 Manufactured goodsclassified chieflybymaterial 13,038 6.3%  7.8% SITC9 Commoditiesand transactionsn.c.e. 8,678 4.2%  11.9% SITC2 Crudematerials, inedible, exceptfuels 8,250 4.0%  11.5% SITC0 Food and liveanimals 5,066 2.5%  5.9% SITC1 Beveragesand tobacco 1,484 0.7%  19.7% SITC4 Animal and vegetable oils, fatsand waxes 255 0.1%  2.8% 
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that EU regulators recognize a third-country regime as 
being of a sufficiently comparable standard, without 
being identical. When an entity is established in a ju-
risdiction deemed equivalent or which grants reciprocal 
access to EU entities, it is not required to comply with 
EU regulation when dealing with EU firms. 
 Although some equivalence clauses had already 
been included in a couple of EU pre-crisis directives 
(notably, the Financial Conglomerates directive), this 
trend intensified after the global financial crisis. The 
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) (2009), 
the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
(AIFMs) (2011), the European Markets Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) (2012), the revision of the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) 
all contain equivalence clauses, designed to establish 
the equivalence of financial services regulation in third 
countries with EU rules. Furthermore, the EMIR and 
the MiFID II/MiFIR also include ‘reciprocity’ provisions, 
promoting the concept of ‘equivalent reciprocal recog-
nition’. Finally, some provisions do not apply only to 
third-country firms doing business in the EU or with EU 
counterparts. They also apply to transactions between 
counterparties in third countries, if they have a ‘direct, 
substantial and foreseeable’ effect within the EU. 
 To be fair, the EU is neither the first nor the only 
jurisdiction whose legislation has significant extrater-
ritorial effects for third countries and firms. In the past, 
US securities markets legislation had considerable 
extraterritorial reach (see the Securities Act of 1933). 
More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2004) contained 
extraterritorial provisions concerning, amongst other 
things, the regulation and monitoring of auditing. The 
Dodd-Frank Act also has potential extraterritorial effects 
especially the Volcker rule concerning the structure of 
the banking industry, the Collins amendment, regarding 
the treatment of foreign banking operations in the US 
and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trading and 
clearing (these were issues that the European Com-
mission was keen to include in the TTIP).
 Yet, the extraterritorial impact of post-crisis financial 
services regulation in the EU is puzzling for several 
reasons. First, the EU, unlike the US, has traditionally 
favored a multilateral approach to global governance, 
including in financial services (Posner and Veron 2010). 
It is quite unusual for the EU to take a unilateralist 
stance, like the one adopted after the crisis in financial 
services. Second, prior to the global financial crisis, 
the US had toned down its extraterritorial approach in 
financial regulation. Third, financial globalization has 
increased the political and economic costs of unilater-
alism, making extraterritoriality less feasible (Brummer 
2012). Moreover, this approach leaves the unilateralist 
(in this case, the EU) vulnerable to the retaliations of 
other jurisdictions.
 What explains the EU’s treatment of third coun-
tries and the extraterritoriality of most post-crisis EU 
financial regulation? The starting point is the age 
old-dilemma between stability and competitiveness in 
designing financial regulation, where more regulation 
may promote stability but has the potential to reduce 
the competitiveness of domestic firms because they 
are subject to competition from foreign firms that are 
less strictly regulated. The global financial crisis was 
an external shock to financial stability in the EU, as 
elsewhere, and the extraterritorial approach of EU 
post-crisis legislation is mostly determined by the EU’s 
attempt to restore financial stability in its territory while 
maintaining the competitiveness of its financial industry. 
It allows additional regulation while it prevents the loss 
of competitiveness that results from increased regula-
tion in the EU financial sector by imposing the new 
stricter rules on foreign as well as domestic firms. This 
conflict between stability and competition in financial 
regulation is further complicated in a regional (multi-
level) jurisdiction, such as the EU, where different 
countries experience somewhat different trade-offs 
under this dilemma, depending on their domestic po-
litical economy, primarily the structure of their financial 
industry and approach to financial regulation, or model 
of financial competitiveness. The global financial crisis 
has changed the balance of regulatory power in the 
EU, empowering those member states most keen to 
project EU regulatory power externally (Pagliari 2012). 
The result has been a shift in policy whereby the EU 
has attempted to externalize its regulatory dilemma. 
Lucia Quaglia (University of York)
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The Geopolitics of the TTIP as Seen from Beijing
Miguel Otero-Iglesias 
 (The article draws on interviews with Chinese officials 
and experts at think tanks conducted during a fieldwork trip 
to Beijing in June/July 2013.)
 Gradually, over the past decade, China has worked 
hard to be on the winning end of the multilaterally-
conceived World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. 
Based on its large domestic market, its break-neck 
double figure growth rates, its comparative advantage in 
labor-intensive manufacturing and its increased sophis-
tication in international diplomacy, the Middle Kingdom 
is starting to use the WTO to its own advantage. For 
example, when it has considered that proposals ema-
nating from Western powers would harm its national 
interests, China has been able to form alliances against 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) 
with other emerging markets, such as India and Brazil, 
(the stalemate of the Doha Round epitomizes this). In 
doing so, China has made increasingly good use of 
the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) and 
appeal procedures to protect its export and import-
substitution sectors. Indeed, after some learning, China 
has become smarter in the game of the multilateral 
governance of trade. Arguably, globalization is currently 
working in its favor. 
 However, the announcement by the US and the 
EU to start negotiations toward a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) might be a game 
changer. Precisely at the time when an official from an 
emerging economy, in this case the Brazilian Roberto 
Carvalho de Azevêdo, will be leading the WTO, the US 
and the EU appear to be fed up with the gridlock in the 
Doha Round and have started favoring the bilateral 
over the multilateral route to establish the new rules for 
international trade and investment. This approach has 
drawn criticism from convinced European multilateral-
ists, such as the former head of the WTO Pascal Lamy, 
who thinks that it can undermine the trend towards 
global liberalization.
 Moreover, it has raised concerns in Beijing. Chinese 
officials have the suspicion that both the currently ne-
gotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement 
and the TTIP project pushed forward by the Obama 
Administration have economic but also geopolitical 
objectives. With these new treaties, the US wants to 
upgrade regulations in trade and investments so as to 
make Chinese products less competitive and the Chi-
nese market less attractive. China also suspects that 
America wants simultaneously to reassert its geopoliti-
cal dominance both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.
 Regarding the European Union, the view among 
certain strategic thinkers in Beijing is that the United 
States is concerned about the tightening of commercial, 
investment and political ties between the European 
Union and China in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. 
As a consequence, Washington wants to use the TTIP 
negotiations to redirect the attention of European lead-
ers back toward the US. Their interpretation of American 
strategic maneuvering is as follows. Washington is well 
aware that China has a strong interest in strengthening 
its strategic relations with the EU in order to counter-
balance US hegemony. Hence, every time there are 
real rapprochement efforts between the two sides, the 
United States steps in to weaken the partnership. This 
has happened twice in the past decade. 
 The first occurred between 2003 and 2005 when, 
under the leadership of German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac, the 
EU started to deepen its strategic partnership with 
China. At the time, the Europeans started to collabo-
rate with the Chinese in sensitive sectors such as the 
aerospace project Galileo and considered the option 
of lifting the arms embargo against Beijing (Casarini 
2009).These moves raised major concerns among US 
policymakers and, in response, Washington activated 
its powerful state machinery to dissuade the Europe-
ans from furthering their strategic alliance with Beijing. 
Under this diplomatic pressure, the EU discontinued its 
contracts with Chinese firms within the Galileo project 
and dropped the possibility of lifting the arms embargo. 
This was the end of the so called honeymoon period 
between the European Union and China. 
 However, the second US interference in EU-China 
affairs is occurring now. In the view of Chinese of-
ficials, the Eurozone crisis revived again the potential 
to deepen the strategic partnership between the two 
partners. In recent years, China helped Europe in its 
moment of need, and European countries have in-
creased substantially their exports to China, helping 
them overcome the deep recession. Furthermore, and 
more importantly, China has propped up – through both 
rhetorical support and concrete investments – the single 
currency every time it was in danger. In contrast, the 
US government has provided no direct financial assis-
tance to the Eurozone, and the US press and pundits 
have scare-mongered about a possible break-up of 
the single currency (Otero-Iglesias 2014). Meanwhile, 
Chinese investments to the Eurozone have increased 
substantially.
 As the former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated, 
this support, especially to the weaker peripheral coun-
tries in the Eurozone, should set the stage for Brussels 
to resume its strategic dialogue with China and perhaps 
consider granting it market-economy status and lifting 
the arms embargo against it. Incidentally, in the midst 
of the crisis and as recognition of China’s help, the 
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The Painful Path to Recovery
David L. Cleeton
 On November 5th the European Commission 
released the Autumn 2013 economic forecast for the 
European Union.1  In the aggregate, growth resumed 
during the second quarter of 2013 and there are clear 
signals that a mild recovery will continue over the inter-
mediate term.  While this uptick is expected to leave the 
performance of the EU economy over the calendar year 
perfectly flat, this is a slightly better performance than 
the -0.5% drop recorded during 2012.  Looking ahead 
a continuing modest improvement in economic activity 
is forecasted to produce annual growth rates of 1.4% 
in 2014 and 1.9% in 2015.  The Eurozone continues to 
underperform relative to these modest expectations with 
a 2013 decline of 0.4% and out-year growth forecasts 
of only 1.1% in 2014 and 1.7% in 2015. 
 Beneath the aggregates is substantial variation 
across individual member state performance.  During 
2013 within the 17-member Eurozone, real GDP growth 
covers a range from -8.7% in Cyprus to +4.0% in Latvia 
with eight Eurozone members recording declines.  The 
2014 forecasts show turnarounds for all but two of the 
countries in recession, Cyprus and Slovenia.  
 On the whole, inflationary pressures are only mildly 
problematic in a few Member States.  Overall inflation 
across the EU is expected to hold below the 2% an-
nual upper end of the target range coming in at 1.5% 
in 2013 and holding nearly steady at 1.5% in 2014 and 
1.4% in 2015.  One Eurozone country, Estonia, and 
three non-Eurozone countries, Hungary, Romania, and 
the United Kingdom are forecasted to see persistently 
higher inflation rates above the target, in the range from 
2.1% to 3.4%, over the 2013-15 forecast period.  
 Labor market performance is expected to remain 
dismal as continuing adjustment processes mean un-
employment trends will lag GDP growth by at least half 
a year.  But the stabilization of employment levels rather 
than declines will eventual produce a drop in unemploy-
ment rates.  The overall forecast shows a slight decline 
to an EU unemployment level of 10.7% and 11.8% in the 
Eurozone in 2015.  However, in this case as well, there 
will be a wide range of unemployment levels recorded 
within individual Member States.  During 2013 Austria 
is expected to record an overall unemployment rate of 
5.1% while Greece will post an astonishingly high rate 
of 27.0%.
 While fiscal consolidation continues within the EU, 
as reflected in governmental deficits, continued growth 
will become more dependent on other sources of do-
mestic demand.  The international economic environ-
ment has several important dynamic elements.  The 
United States has seen modest fiscal tightening after 
EUSA Political Economy Interest Section 
possibility of lifting the arms embargo was again raised 
by the head of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), Catherine Ashton, who reportedly argued in 
a confidential strategy paper presented to EU leaders 
that the embargo is a “major impediment for developing 
stronger EU-China co-operation on foreign policy and 
security matters” (Kirkup 2011). 
 From Beijing’s perspective, clear evidence points 
to the fact that the Europeans were again inclined to 
deepen their strategic partnership with China, but yet 
again, US interference stopped the rapprochement. 
First it was Japan, Washington’s main ally in East Asia, 
which criticized Europe’s proposal to eliminate the arms 
ban to China (Willis 2011). A few months later it was the 
UK, the main ally of the US in Europe, which declared 
that it would oppose the lifting of the embargo (Kirkup 
2011).  Now it is Washington ´ s turn, which through the 
TTIP wants to send a clear message to policymakers 
in Brussels that the interest of Europe still lies across 
the Atlantic and not in the Far East. 
 For many in China, it is doubtful whether the TTIP 
will be signed. There are strong protectionist forces both 
in the US and in Europe that can derail the negotiations. 
But one thing is clear: with the TPP and TTIP initiatives 
the United States has regained its leadership role inset-
ting the new rules for global trade and investment. Now 
Beijing needs to think how it responds to these moves. 
It needs to show that it can be an alternative power 
to the US. Trying to close the Investment Partnership 
Agreement with the EU could be a good start. It could 
also be a great opportunity for the Europeans to come 
of age and play a broker role in the geopolitical game 
of determining the new rules for global trade and invest-
ment. 
Miguel Otero-Iglesias 
ESSCA School of Management, Paris
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a prolonged period of expansionary deficits and con-
tinues to struggle with the determination of the optimal 
scenario for winding down the Federal Reserve’s un-
conventional monetary stimulus policy while attempting 
to hold down financial market volatility.  Japan recently 
has been a positive source of significant monetary and 
fiscal expansion.  But overall, with the global weakening 
of emerging market economies, externally produced 
growth opportunities for the EU are shrinking. 
 All in all, the projected growth of domestic demand 
remains subdued as continued balance sheet restruc-
turing occurs in the private sector.  Investment and 
private consumption will continue a gradual expansion 
over the short term.  Positive trends in financial markets 
and profit margins combined with continued reductions 
in excess capacity will boost investment demand.  On 
the household consumption side growth will be more 
constrained as employment and wage growth remains 
weak.   
 The current status of the Franco-German engine 
of the Eurozone serves to illustrate the challenges and 
divergences limiting overall economic growth in the 
EU.  In Germany real GDP growth in 2013 is expected 
to come in at only 0.5% but to rise to 1.7% in 2014. In 
the past six months export-growth expansion has been 
turned back slightly by a combination of a general slow-
down in the global economy and the continued strength 
of the euro.  This has been offset by a brighter outlook 
for domestic demand with continued low interest rates 
and positive wage and employment supporting house-
hold consumption. These trends are starting to feed 
through to boost investment as profit margins rise and 
excess capacity shrinks.
  In France, real GDP growth of 0.2% in 2013 is 
set to only move up slightly to 0.9% in 2014.  France 
enjoys a significantly higher rate of population growth 
than does Germany but this growth factor is offset by 
increasing unemployment and taxation.  It is expected 
that the lagged upturn in employment in 2015 will finally 
produce a boost to household consumption.  While 
stability in companies’ financing has returned, improved 
profit margins and lowered excess capacity will not feed 
through to boost investment until beyond 2014. 
 On the fiscal side, the German general govern-
ment balance which moved to breakeven in 2012-13 is 
expected to remain near a zero balance going forward 
through 2015.  France on the other hand continues to 
struggle with its deficit which is expected to come in 
at -4.1% of GDP during 2013 even after a significant 
revision upward of the revenue package.  While hold-
ing down expenditure growth, tax revenue increases 
have not grown rapidly enough in a slow-growth envi-
ronment to improve the overall balance.  Deficit fore-
casts continue close to the -3.75% level going forward 
through 2014-15.  Of course further concessions and 
compromises with the Commission will be needed going 
forward with the budget.
 The overall EU GDP growth forecast for 2014 
dropped to 1.1% from a projected 1.2% in the Spring 
2013 forecast and is down from 1.4% at the beginning 
of the year.  Combined with a current low inflation rate, 
an annualized rate of 0.7% in the Eurozone during Oc-
tober, and concerns about the high value of the euro, 
the new forecasts are sure to stir renewed debate about 
the proper direction of movement in ECB interest rate 
policy.2
David L. Cleeton
Illinois State University
Notes 
1 European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2013, 
European Economy, No. 7, 2013, European Commis-
sion, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. 
2 Eurozone Growth Revision Raises Fears, Finan-
cial Times, 6 November 2013, p. 4)
The EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to 
announce the online publication of the first EUSA 
Biennial Conference Special Issue of the Journal 
of European Public Policy (JEPP). This Special 
Issue includes seven (revised) papers selected 
by peer review from amongst those nominated 
by discussants and chairs as among the best pre-
sented at 2011 Biennial EUSA conference. The 
Special Issue can be found at http://www.tand-
fonline.com. The paper version is now available. 
We look forward to continuing this collaboration 
between JEPP and EUSA in the future and ex-
pect that 6-8 papers from the 2013 EUSA Con-
ference, May 9-11, 2013, in the Baltimore/Wash-
ington DC metro area, will again be selected for 
publication in a future special JEPP/EUSA issue.
EUSA members interested in reviewing recent 
EU-related books, please fill out the form for po-
tential reviewers located on our website-www.
eustudies.org.
Publishers should send a review copy
of books directly to the EUSA office, 415 Belle-
field Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15206, USA
Book Reviews
Ruano, Lorena (ed.). The Europeanization of Nation-
al Foreign Policies Towards Latin America. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2013.
 The literature on Europeanization has so far 
largely focused on EU member states’ domestic policy 
convergence and the ability of individual members 
states to align EU policies with their national policy 
preferences. The Europeanization of National Foreign 
Policies Towards Latin America produces a system-
atic framework for studying Europeanization of foreign 
policy with seven in depth case studies. Each chap-
ter analyzes the role of member states in shaping the 
EU’s Latin America policy and discusses how member 
states’ national policies have been affected by the EU 
policy in return. Each contributor characterizes the dy-
namic of the member state’s Latin America policy – so 
called “upload, download, or crossload (sideways) Eu-
ropeanization,” as well as variation over policy areas, 
and the level of EU competence that comes with them, 
and time.  The expectation is that the degree to which 
states will download EU policy towards Latin America 
depends on the EU competency in the policy area un-
der question. That is to say, this study has replaced 
the “low to high” dichotomy of the variable “pressure to 
adapt” with the categories “social,” “legal,” and “mixed.” 
In policy areas in which the EU has exclusive compe-
tency states have a legal obligation to adapt, while in 
policy areas in which the national government has ex-
clusive competency, or where competency is shared, 
social forces such as peer pressure can lead states 
to adapt their domestic policy. Additionally, goodness 
of fit, as the compatibility of EU and national policy 
preferences, also affects if and how states download 
EU policy. Regarding the uploading of national policy 
preferences to the EU there are also two major vari-
ables to consider: interest and power. States are ex-
pected to be more successful in shaping EU policy in 
accordance with national policy preferences when the 
policy issue is considered a national priority, and when 
states have the resources and capacity to build a co-
alition around a policy issue.  
 The cases presented in this volume represent 
EU member states with different levels of interest in 
and historical connections with Latin America. Spain 
is the only case discussed that has made EU – Latin 
American relations a clear priority in its foreign policy. 
The editor made the conscious decision not to include 
other cases of EU member states with strong histori-
cal tries to Latin America, such as Portugal or Italy. 
Instead, the other cases selected are representing 
the main movers in European foreign policy, France 
and the UK, Europe’s largest economy, Germany, 
and three cases that represent Nordic states, Swe-
den, Eastern states, Poland, and small states, Ireland. 
The editor has chosen cases that show the greatest 
variance on the dependent variables of change in na-
tional policy (download) and the shaping of EU policy 
(upload). This is understandable if the goal of the vol-
ume is to explain the different factors that determine 
whether states act as policy uploader or downloader. 
At the same time it may seem a bit obvious that large 
and powerful states, France, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany are more likely to upload their foreign poli-
cy preferences in the EU policy making process. It is 
equally expectable that Spain, also one of the larger 
member states, and the only state with a clear foreign 
policy preference for Latin America, would also try to 
upload its policy preferences to the EU. If states such 
as Italy or Portugal were part of this volume it would 
have been interesting to assess the different rates 
of success in uploading one’s national foreign policy 
preferences by states that are driven by interest rather 
than power.  The present volume suggests among the 
policy uploaders only Spain as interest driven, while 
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany because 
of their sheer power in EU policy making are affecting 
the process even when Latin America ranks fairly low 
as a foreign policy priority.  
 Spain is analytically the most interesting case 
because as it joined the EU only in 1986 and was 
forced to download EU external relations policy that, 
under the influence of France and the United King-
dom, focused on ACP states. Spain was successful 
in uploading its policy preferences not because it was 
able to rekindle interest in Latin America among other 
EU member states (crossload), but rather because the 
lack of interest coincided with the absence of strong 
opposition to more EU engagement with Latin Amer-
ica. The cases of Sweden, Poland, and Ireland, that 
are neither powerful foreign policy players, nor have 
a particular interest in Latin America due to colonial 
history or cultural and identity factors, are marked as 
downloaders as Europeanization amplifies their voice 
and provides them with collective leverage.  
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 Latin America remains a region of low foreign 
policy priority for most EU member states. All cases 
presented in this volume show an interest in expand-
ing trade relations with countries in Latin America, es-
pecially with Brazil, but because trade relations are an 
exclusive EU competency, most nations have already 
successfully downloaded the EU policy and national 
policies are already aligned. Crossloading in policy 
areas such as development cooperation, democracy, 
and human rights promotion, is difficult to pinpoint and 
hard to distinguish from efforts of uploading national 
policy preferences. Overall, this volume represents an 
important contribution to the area of Europeanization 
of foreign policy. The conceptual framework is well de-
veloped and can be used with different cases and or 
regions. 
Martyn de Bruyn
Northeastern Illinois University
Lavenex, S., and F. Schimmelfennig (eds.). Democ-
racy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Le-
verage to Governance?  Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
 This edited volume offers a reproduction of 
Democratization 18(4). It is about the constrained 
attempts of the EU to promote democracy in neigh-
bouring countries, including when conditionality instru-
ments fail. Quite fortunately for tired readers of inco-
herent edited volumes, the editors have done a fine 
job in focusing all contributions on exactly that theme. 
This, and the sheer information contained in the chap-
ters, makes the book a very welcome and enlightening 
addition to the literature on Europe’s foreign policy.   
 In the introductory chapter, Lavenex and Schim-
melfennig review the evolution of the EU’s democracy-
promotion policy, define the three models of external 
democracy promotion (bottom-up linkage, top-down 
leverage, and functional cooperation between ad-
ministrations – note that these do not exactly corre-
spond to the three models of external governance in 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) which the EU 
can use to achieve its goals, and argue that functional 
cooperation between administrations may certainly 
be less ambitious than top-down leverage, but is also 
probably more efficacious than pure stick-and-carrot 
policies when dealing with countries which are not 
candidates to EU accession. In chapter 2, Kubicek, an 
expert in Turkish politics, argues that Turkey is a case 
where top-down leverage worked well throughout the 
first half of the 2000s, but then failed as soon as the 
EU’s commitment to the two-way deal with the target 
country appeared to be waning. He concludes that 
“the EU’s application of leverage and linkage to foster 
democracy in Turkey will remain contested and prob-
lematic.” (p. 42) In chapter 3, Del Sarto and Schum-
acher offer a refreshingly critical assessment of the 
Union’s superficial (and therefore either hypocritical or 
naïve) benchmarking policy, with case studies on Jor-
dan and Tunisia. Unfortunately, their contribution was 
written before the Arab spring, which allowed them to 
base their analysis on the observation that “with more 
than seven years into the ENP, both the Maghreb and 
the Mashreq have proven to remain, broadly speak-
ing, immune to wide-ranging and sustainable political 
reforms.” (p. 50) In chapter 4, Casier uses the case of 
the Ukraine to investigate why the EU has been more 
successful in promoting formal democracy rather than 
substantive democracy. His explanation resembles 
Del Sarto and Schumacher’s argument: the structure 
of the EU’s policies allows elites in the target country 
to get by complying at a superficial level (i.e. without 
really taking ownership of the reforms). In chapter 5, 
Wetzel offers a particularly interesting “political” expla-
nation for the policy failures identified in the preced-
ing chapters: policy incoherence may be the result 
of successful mobilization on behalf of negatively af-
fected domestic constituencies in the EU. In chapter 
6, Freybourg presents the results of a very interest-
ing quantitative analysis of Moroccan state officials’ 
attitudes towards democratic governance. Using ex-
planatory factor analysis, she is able to show that joint 
problem-solving does make Moroccan officials more 
pro-democratic. (Though, of course, she does not re-
port any findings about EU officials becoming more 
authoritarian!) Finally, in chapter 7, Freybourg et alias 
use comparative case studies to argue that the pro-
democracy impact of functional sectoral cooperation 
is enhanced by mostly sectoral (as opposed to polity-
wide) attributes.             
 Against this background, three thoughts spring 
to mind of this reviewer. First, this volume is in many 
ways an exploration of the limits of, and alternatives 
to, the top-down leverage model – i.e. of conditional-
ity policies. The implicit assumption is that condition-
ality fails when either (a) the stick or the carrot is not 
big enough, or (b) when the commitment to using it is 
not credible. In other words, a familiar upward-sloping 
supply curve obtains: target countries produce demo-
cratic reforms as a function of the price the EU is truly 
willing to pay. Although this “economistic” assumption 
is intuitive, it is not openly discussed in the book. Yet 
it is conceivable that (some) nations are not as incen-
tivisable as your rank-and-file economic agent (e.g. 
pin-, shoe-, or lecture-makers). Some may not need 
external incentives to produce the goods in question 
(in this case, democratic reform). If that were the case, 
then top-down leverage might fail, not because it is 
not powerful enough (as the contributors to the vol-
ume assume), but simply because it exists (see the 
general argument in Bénabou and Tirole 2003). 
 Second, some contributions seem to conceive 
of the three models of external democracy promotion 
as alternatives whose combined causal impact can 
be easily disentangled. Yet these models belong to 
outright different theoretical worlds (or, in the realm of 
real-world policy-making, they have outright different 
temporalities). Any “test” of a rationalistic hypothesis 
(such as the top-down leverage model) that relies on 
a longitudinal story of political development over a 
decade is as bound to commit a type-II error as any 
test of a constructivist hypothesis that relied on one-
dimensional cross-sections.      
 Finally, although all the qualitative chapters 
are written by scholars who are obviously very knowl-
edgeable about their cases, most contributions would 
have gained if cast in a more methodologically self-
conscious manner. For example, in the face of some 
backlashes in Turkish reforms even before 2005, the 
story about the causal role of external incentives might 
need to be re-examined using explicit counterfactual 
thought experiments (Fearon 1991). Similarly, the 
comparative studies of Jordan/Tunisia and of envi-
ronmental/fisheries policies are both based on case 
studies chosen on the basis of the variation of each 
author’s preferred independent variable, without any 
discussion of how they controlled for other, potentially 
causal variables.
 Of course, none of these tentative thoughts 
should be enough to discourage interested readers 
from buying and reading this book. The analytical 
rigour of the editors, and the substantive knowledge of 
the contributors, makes it easily one of the best books 
written to date on an important and topical issue.    
Yannis Karagiannis 
Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals 
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McCormick, John.  Why Europe Matters: The Case 
for the European Union. New York: Palgrave MacMil-
lan, 2013.
 In Zurich in 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of 
making all Europeans happy and free, by re-creating 
“the European Family…and to provide it with a struc-
ture under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and 
in freedom . . . [t]hrough a type of United States of 
Europe.” He asked “why should there not be a Eu-
ropean group which could give a sense of enlarged 
patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted 
peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent?” Near-
ly seven decades later that vision has materialized; 
attributable, according to McCormick, primarily to the 
development of the European Union. His main argu-
ment is that European integration – here McCormick 
also includes other pan-European organizations such 
as the Council of Europe and the European Court of 
Human Rights – has improved the lives of Europeans 
more than they tend to recognize and appreciate.
 Explaining the EU as a confederacy with sepa-
ration of powers, including elected legislators, national 
government representatives, an independent judiciary, 
and stronger laws on transparency and easier access 
to public documents than in most member states, Mc-
Cormick argues that such a structure enhances both 
direct and indirect democracy (26-29, 70-71, 130ff). In 
laying out the many ways in which citizens can hold EU 
officials accountable he also effectively counters the 
longstanding claim of a European democratic deficit. 
Yet European citizens remain largely ignorant of what 
the EU is and how it works, with myths and mispercep-
tions about extraordinary EU powers proving ubiqui-
tous throughout Europe. This, McCormick argues, is 
not only due to the massive distortions of EU policies 
and power prevalent in the media and amongst pun-
dits (especially in the US and UK), but also European 
leaders’ poor communication skills, and citizens dis-
mal efforts at accessing more information themselves 
(152-155).  One example is that 74% of French citi-
zens knew little or nothing about the EU Constitution 
when voting it down in 2005 (80). Yet McCormick ap-
pears more forgiving of citizens than euroskeptic pun-
dits and the press. His frequent invocation of polls and 
surveys showing widespread public support for more 
rather than less Europe in most policy areas, along 
with his persuasive (though frequently repetitive) ex-
planation of the limited independent influences EU in-
stitutions possess, delivers a blow to anti-European 
forces and the many exaggerated claims of EU impo-
sition of laws, while appealing to citizens: “see, you 
actually say you want more EU level policies.” 
 More specifically, McCormick focuses on three 
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areas to convince the reader of how and why Europe 
matters. First, integration has made Europeans less 
nationalistic, insular, and militant; instead they have 
become more communitarian, multilateral, and sup-
portive of an integrated European structure. These 
are part of what McCormick sees as an identifiable 
“europeaness”, which complements and supplements 
national and regional identities (8-15; 89-101). Sec-
ond, most of the problems plaguing the EU today, 
from wasteful spending, limited foreign policy influ-
ence, or the crisis in the Eurozone, are the result of 
poor or inadequate decisions by member states, not 
EU institutions. Unwillingness to erect common EU 
fiscal policies and banking rules to accompany the 
common currency, along with irresponsible national 
policies, was largely to blame for Europe’s fiscal, sov-
ereign debt, and banking problems. Assertive ECB 
policies and the Fiscal Compact (2012) were EU level 
responses that helped mitigate the crisis. Third, EU 
integration is argued to have has solved many prob-
lems and overcome many challenges since the EU’s 
inception. European citizens are safer, healthier, and 
richer thanks to European-level cooperation and inte-
gration, which also enables member states to achieve 
more social progress and exert greater international 
influence than they could on their own. Improved cli-
mate policy, improved labor standards, no currency 
exchange or border controls, stronger intra-EU trade, 
and common peacekeeping operations are among the 
many enumerated benefits. Thus, the argument goes, 
more integration is (almost) always better than indi-
vidual state action. 
 There are nevertheless some shortcomings. 
Public support for more EU level action (113) is not 
equitable with support for integration (sharing sover-
eignty). The section on the euro crises could also have 
been expanded beyond six pages; merely stating that 
it was a political project and that its current malaise will 
somehow be solved is insufficient for all but those who 
already possess a good understanding of the euro cri-
sis. One can also quibble with some of his most pro-
vocative statements such as there being little attention 
paid to EU’s success in international trade (180). Any 
browsing of the EU literature shows otherwise. Finally, 
some will doubtlessly view McCormick’s conspicuous 
misgivings about much of American economic and 
military policy as exemplifying an overtly normative 
bias for European integration and the welfare state. 
This would be missing the point. Though the scholar’s 
criticism of US policies at times equals his unbridled 
enthusiasm for Europe’s accomplishments and poten-
tial, he does not shy away from highlighting numerous 
weaknesses in EU institutions, or criticizing EU poli-
cies (ch. 8). However, those seeking detailed policy 
ideas or specific proposals for reform will be left want-
ing. Solutions to Europe’s problems are left for others 
to present – his vague and brief attempts thereto not-
withstanding (156-162). 
 Despite the aforementioned problems this is 
truly an excellent exposé of European accomplish-
ments. McCormick does us all a great favor by re-
minding us of how much good has come from the Eu-
ropean project, for that reason it is well worth reading 
– especially by Europeans. 
Leif Johan Eliasson
East Stroudsburg University
Zimmermann, Hubert and Dür, Andreas (eds.). Key 
Controversies in European Integration. Houndsmills 
and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.
 
 In light of the crises of the European Union 
since 2008, teaching the European Union has become 
even more an endeavor of not merely discussing the 
development and process of European integration 
and European-level institutions but one of articulating, 
illuminating, and discussing the often contentious prin-
ciples, procedures, policies, and outcomes of Europe-
an integration.  Beyond primary textbooks, additional 
readings and scholarship that concisely and decisively 
illustrate the many contending arguments regarding 
European integration and the European Union have 
often been difficult to find in any one location or have 
proven difficult to digest for primarily undergraduate 
audiences. This edited volume by Hubert Zimmer-
mann and Andreas Dür quite ably and successfully 
fills such a role for use in courses on the politics and 
development of the European Union. 
 The format of the book is similar to the Tak-
ing Sides series of supplemental texts produced by 
McGraw-Hill for use in many introductory and inter-
mediate level undergraduate political science courses 
in that the chapters are divided between a pair of op-
posing or competing arguments about a particularistic 
issue or debate. A great asset of this text beyond the 
debates themselves are that they are authored by top 
scholars of many facets of European integration in-
cluding John McCormick, Karen J. Alter, Amy Verdun, 
Desmond Dinan, Christopher Lord, and many others. 
The book is not necessarily exhaustive nor necessar-
ily intended to provide introductory definitions of key 
concepts or terms related to the EU and European 
integration, however used in conjunction with a pri-
mary textbook or other introductory readings the vol-
ume provides an intellectually deeper  and excellent 
spectrum of debate of arguably the most important, 
contentious, and current issues. Further, the textual 
material and extensive bibliography provide an excel-
lent resource for more detailed research for students 
and scholars alike. 
 One innovative and important role for this vol-
ume is the nesting of the European Union and integra-
tion within a framework as a political process. As Dür 
and Zimmermann adeptly argue in the introduction, 
they begin with an “assumption that the European 
Union is an open-ended and strongly contested proj-
ect” with both remarkable successes and deep flaws 
and that “it always has been” (2,3). Hence, the text 
begins with an a priori conception of philosophical and 
political debate, compromise, and contention that is 
sometimes absent from others texts on the EU and 
integration which focus far too much on the historical 
and institutional development of the union distinct from 
the political contestation that surrounded such devel-
opments.  One of the added strengths of the introduc-
tion and conclusion is a brief but useful encapsulation 
of the development of the scholarly debate of Europe-
an integration beginning with Haas’ neofunctionalism 
and Hoffman’s intergovernmentalism leading to liberal 
intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance ap-
proaches and beyond. In conjunction with primary 
textbooks and other course materials this works well 
to rather basically and cogently lay out the develop-
ment of integration literature and scholarship in just a 
few pages. 
 The first few chapters are dedicated to me-
ta-level European integration debates including as-
sessment of the successes and failures of the EU as 
a whole, patterns of EU efficiency, and propriety of 
centralization versus decentralization of the union’s 
regulatory, market, and political governance. In chap-
ter 1, John McCormick and John Gillingham argue at 
the highest level of abstraction as to whether the EU 
has been a “success”. While one could accuse both 
of over-selectivity of evidence in defending their posi-
tions, combined they demonstrate the very mixed re-
sults of the integration experience and process with all 
its highs and lows. Even more insightful is the chapter 
2 exchange between Desmond Dinan and Mats Pers-
son over the efficiency of the EU in which both authors 
skillfully argue is an inherently complex and rather 
unique system of governance with both benefits and 
flaws. Chapter 3 debates the propriety of centraliza-
tion of authority in Brussels versus national govern-
ments and fits quite nicely into the overarching and 
longstanding debates between intergovernmentalists 
and supranationalists especially in light of the Lisbon 
Treaty and subsequent developments. Perhaps one 
of the most thought-provoking debates appears in 
chapter 4 as Richard Bellamy and Christopher Lord 
argues the democratic deficit of the union. Lord’s brief 
and concise analysis of the quality of European Union 
democracy is ripe with concise reason and possible 
routes of reform. 
 The remaining ten chapters tend to deal with 
more specific policy or problematic issues including 
the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
creation of a European identity, the future of the Euro, 
regulation of finance, Cohesion Policy, Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP), foreign policymaking, the global 
role of the union, enlargement, and the Common Se-
curity and Defense Policy (CSDP). In some cases the 
authors focus on one specific or well-trodden issue 
or problem as emblematic of a broader phenomenon 
or take a fairly narrow polemic or scholarly-oriented 
tact in making their argument. Some of the chapters 
or portions of chapters on Cohesion Policy, CAP, and 
the role of interest groups in making foreign economic 
policy fall into this category. Others such as chapter 5 
by Karen J. Alter and Jeremy Rabkin on the role of the 
ECJ create complimentary bookends on the credits 
and deficits of the EU, its institutions, and the process 
of integration. Important chapters in the wake of the 
seemingly never-ending currency, financial, banking, 
employment, and growth crises include the chapter 
7 debate over the future of the Euro by Amy Verdun 
and Tal Sadeh and the chapter 8 discussion of the 
EU’s ability to regulate financial markets between Jörn 
Carsten Gottwald and Daniel Mügge. Both provide a 
quite useful and additional set of arguments over the 
role of the EU and its responses to the post-2008 cri-
ses. The last four chapters focus on EU external policy 
through foreign economic and trade policy, the EU’s 
normative power in global affairs, enlargement, and 
CSDP. Again while some of the chapters cover fairly 
common turf they do so in an engaging and adversar-
ial manner which lends to greater conceptualization 
and thinking about these debates. 
 In the conclusion, co-editor Andreas Dür ulti-
mately does leave the volume on an optimistic note 
regarding the future of the union and integration stat-
ing that the union has “weathered too many storms to 
be written off easily” (234). But importantly Dür also 
explicitly addresses the scholarly changes that have 
occurred in the study of European integration having 
moved beyond an “either/or” schism between supra-
nationalism and intergovernmentalism which this vol-
ume also ably encompasses (233). 
 One of the strengths of this volume is that the 
authors often stake out fairly identifiable and strong 
claims about the propriety and efficacy of the EU, its 
policies, and the integration process in a way that can 
effectively spark debate and makes identification of 
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divergent positions more clear. Sometimes this leads 
to occasional generalizations, omissions, and some-
times overstretching philosophic or policy positions. In 
other cases the debate is so nuanced or policy spe-
cific that it could be considered as having missed the 
forest for the trees which could elude many under-
graduate students. Nonetheless, with such few weak-
nesses in mind and caution put forth, the overall utility 
and success of the text in fulfilling its primary goals is 
quite well done and a remarkable addition to potential 
course readings. 
Paul Simon Adams
University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg
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